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In December 2007 the ARL released a 
white paper titled Educational Fair Use Today 
by Jonathan Band, a well-known lawyer 
based in Washington, DC, who specializes in 
intellectual property issues related to technol-
ogy law and policy.  In its press release accom-
panying the posting of the paper at the ARL’s 
Website (http://www.arl.org/news/pr/ed-fair-
use-12dec07.shtml), the ARL presented the 
value of the paper in this way:  “Band discusses 
three recent appellate decisions concerning fair 
use that should give educators and librarians 
greater confidence and guidance for asserting 
this important privilege.”  I would like to sug-
gest that educators and librarians are ill advised 
to use this paper as a basis for such “greater 
confidence.”
The paper analyzes three recent appellate 
court decisions, one in the Ninth Circuit and 
two in the Second Circuit.  With Band’s analy-
sis of the two latter cases, Blanch	v.	Koons and 
Bill	Graham	Archives	v.	Dorling	Kindersley, 
I have no argument.  These are what might be 
regarded as classic fair-use cases fully in con-
formity with the long tradition of jurisprudence 
in this area.  If there is anything controversial 
at all about the second of these two cases, it 
would be that the seven images of post-
ers about the Grateful Dead owned by 
the Archives and included in the book 
published by DK were reproduced 
in their entirety, albeit in reduced 
size.  But I don’t think there are 
any copyright experts today who 
would argue that use of an entire 
work, especially an image, would 
automatically not be fair if used 
in a “transformative” way.  So 
comfortable do most attorneys feel 
about such use these days that the 
counsel for Penn State are allow-
ing our press to publish a book on 
the philosophy of black film using 
35 film stills without permission 
from the rightsholders on the grounds that 
their use for purposes of scholarly comment 
and criticism in our book is exactly what fair 
use has traditionally been meant to allow. 
University presses have perhaps been too timid 
in the past about testing the limits of fair use, 
shackled as they usually are by the risk-averse 
attitudes of university attorneys, but core uses 
like this are so clear-cut that the risks seem 
very minimal indeed.
The other case, Perfect	10	v.	Amazon.com, 
decided in the Ninth Circuit is quite different 
and readily distinguishable from the Second 
Circuit cases in a way that Band obfuscates by 
emphasizing instead that, “in all three cases, the 
courts found commercial uses to be fair.”  True, 
but it has been firmly established at least since 
the Supreme Court decided the landmark fair-
use case of Campbell	v.	Acuff	Rose in 1994 
that the commercial nature of the use can be 
trumped by the “transformative” purpose of the 
use.  This is what allows commercial publishers 
to rely on fair use just as nonprofit presses do, 
when they are publishing books and journals 
that quote passages or reproduce images from 
previous works in the process of advancing 
scholarship, the paradigmatic application of 
fair use that is undergirded by the Constitu-
tional language of Article 1, which affirms 
the purpose of copyright protection to 
be “promoting the Progress of Sci-
ence and the Useful Arts” or, in the 
words of the first U.S. Copyright 
Act of 1790, “the encouragement 
of learning.”
Before pointing to what im-
portantly distinguishes the Ninth 
Circuit from the Second Circuit 
decisions, it may be useful to say a 
word about the differences between 
these two circuits themselves.  The 
Second Circuit has long been 
regarded as the premier circuit 
for the adjudication of copyright 
cases.  Such landmark cases as Texaco	 and	
Kinko’s were decided in the Second Circuit, 
for example, and the Google case is currently 
in progress there.  One reason, of course, is 
that the publishing industry in the U.S. is 
heavily concentrated in New York City, and it 
is therefore no accident that so many copyright 
cases end up in this Circuit.  Another reason 
is that the Second Circuit boasts probably 
the leading expert in copyright law in Judge 
Pierre Leval, long a district court judge (as 
he was in presiding over the Texaco case) but 
now a member of the Court of Appeals there. 
Leval is the author of what is perhaps the most 
widely cited article on fair use, “Toward a Fair 
Use Standard”, Harvard Law Review (March 
1990).  In it he argues strongly for the propo-
sition that “transformative” use is “the soul 
of fair use.”  The Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Campbell embodies the spirit of Leval’s argu-
ment as it viewed “transformative” use as the 
decisive element in weighing the four factors 
in this case involving a parody.  So, too, do 
the two rulings in the Second Circuit cited 
by Band in his white paper, not surprisingly 
because Judge Leval sits on the appeals court 
that decided these cases!
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, has been 
out on a limb in many ways in this area of 
jurisprudence, espousing theories that have 
no support in other circuits and little support 
among academic experts either.  A good ex-
ample is an extension of the Perfect 10 case, 
Perfect	10	v.	Visa	International, which is now 
on appeal to the Supreme Court.  In this case, 
Perfect 10 is seeking to hold Visa and Master 
Card liable for vicarious and contributory 
infringement because they service offshore 
businesses that are known by these credit 
card companies to be illegally reproducing 
and selling images copyrighted by Perfect 
10.  The question presented on appeal is this: 
“Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding, contrary 
to long-established principles of secondary 
copyright liability, that financial institutions 
and credit card companies cannot be liable, as 
a matter of law, for the services they provide 
to Websites that traffic in stolen copyrighted 
works, even if they know the Websites are 
engaged in massive infringement, they profit 
from each infringing transaction, they have 
both the contractual right and the practical abil-
ity to stop or limit the infringing activity, and 
the infringing Websites cannot viably function 
without the services these companies provide?” 
In a sharp dissent commenting on the tortured 
reasoning his colleagues used to arrive at their 
decision, Judge Kozinski wrote that the court 
has made “very new — and very bad — law,” 
which “conflicts with every material assistance 
case that I know of” and “will prove to be no 
end of trouble.”  He added:  “If such active 
participation in infringing conduct does not 
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amount to indirect infringement, it’s hard to 
imagine what would.”  Driving the majority’s 
determination to reach the conclusion it did was 
a dubious theory of what public policy requires: 
“1.  to promote the continued development of 
the Internet and other interactive media [and] 
2.  to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered 
by Federal or State regulation.”  Apart from the 
fact that it is the function of the legislature, not 
the judiciary, to decide what U.S. public policy 
is, the flaw of this analysis was succinctly 
noted by Judge Kozinski:  “there is no policy 
of the United States to encourage electronic 
commerce in stolen goods, illegal drugs, or 
child pornography.”
This case alone should make people wary 
of relying on Ninth Circuit decisions as solid 
ground for inferring what copyright law is. 
But it might be noted, too, that the Supreme 
Court in a unanimous decision in June 2005 
overturned the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision of a year earlier finding in favor 
of Grokster, which of course went out of ex-
istence after the Supreme Court ruling in the 
face of multiple infringement suits.  Band asks 
us to trust the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in the 
Perfect	10	v.	Amazon.com rulings.  Considered 
within this broader context, however, there is 
every reason to be suspicious of how this court 
arrives at its decisions.  In fact, it offers a per-
fect example of what Georgia Harper argues 
to be the norm for deciding fair-use cases in her 
article “Google This!” (http://www.utsystem.
edu/ogc/intellectualproperty/googlethis.htm). 
Building on an earlier analysis by Wendy 
Gordon, Harper shows that, at least in the 
more controversial cases where precedents may 
not be directly or clearly relevant, judges will 
ordinarily reach their conclusions about fair 
use on the basis of their own understanding 
of what is most socially beneficial and then, 
conforming to the requirements of legal pro-
cedure, explain their decisions in terms of the 
four-factor analysis.  It is quite obvious in the 
Perfect	10	v.	Visa case that the Ninth Circuit 
exactly followed this procedure, deciding first 
what “public policy” demands and then inter-
preting the law of vicarious and contributory 
liability accordingly.  I would submit that the 
court did exactly the same in Perfect	 10	 v.	
Amazon.com.  Because of its strong bias in 
favor of promoting the Internet as a crucial tool 
of “free market” commerce, the court here de-
cided that the functionality of Google’s search 
engine entitles it to exalted status as a socially 
beneficial instrumentality.  As Mr. Band says, 
“In fact, the court went so far as to say that ‘a 
search engine may be more transformative 
than a parody,’ the quintessential fair use, 
‘because a search engine provides an entirely 
new use for the original work, while a parody 
typically has the same entertainment purpose 
as the original work.”  I submit that this is 
fundamentally flawed reasoning that it would 
be dangerous for any educational institution 
to take as gospel.
In a sense, of course, the Constitutional 
purpose as expressed in Article 1 makes the 
utilitarian nature of copyright law clear enough: 
creators are given a limited monopoly over their 
copyrighted works for the sake of advancing 
learning.  But traditionally what fair use has 
meant as a crucial part of copyright is a means of 
making sure that the monopoly does not extend 
too far and thereby hinder the creativity of others 
who wish to build on past work, adding value to 
it by embedding it in new work in the context 
of comment and criticism.  Until Congress 
passed the 1976 Copyright Act, fair use never 
justified the sheer duplication of copies of the 
original as a substitute for it.  Section 107 does, 
of course, contain a reference to the making 
of “multiple copies” for classroom use as an 
example of copying that might be considered 
fair use under certain circumstances.  Congress 
claimed not to be changing the interpretation 
of fair use as already undertaken in the courts, 
but in this and some other respects, as Kenny 
Crews notes in his book Copyright, Fair Use, 
and the Challenge for Universities (Chicago, 
1993), “despite its denials, Congress was un-
questionably changing the law” (p. 32).  The 
study of fair use commissioned by Congress 
as background for its deliberations leading up 
to the 1976 Act found not a single case where 
such making of multiple copies for their own 
sake constituted fair use.
It is Congress’s prerogative to decide what 
activities should be regarded as legal if they ben-
efit the public sufficiently, and in this instance 
its preference (as influenced by heavy lobbying 
from the educational sector) was made clear 
thenceforth.  But it is important to realize how 
radical a departure this was from the previous 
judicial history of fair use, and it remains to be 
seen how much the judiciary will itself sanction 
this departure from settled legal precedent.  In 
one notable instance, it did not.  Judge New-
man, writing for the majority in the Texaco deci-
sion, declared:  “We would seriously question 
whether the fair use analysis that has developed 
with respect to works of authorship alleged to 
use portions of copyrighted material is precisely 
applicable to copies produced by mechanical 
means.  The traditional fair use analysis, now 
codified in section 107, developed in an effort 
to adjust the competing interests of the authors 
— the author of the original copyrighted work 
and the author of the secondary work that ‘cop-
ies’ a portion of the original work in the course 
of producing what is claimed to be a new work. 
Mechanical ‘copying’ of an entire document, 
made readily feasible by the advent of xerog-
raphy is obviously an activity entirely different 
from creating a work of authorship.  Whatever 
social utility copying of this sort achieves, it is 
not concerned with creative authorship (italics 
added).”  Please note that this decision was 
made by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
and therefore exists as binding precedent for 
this Circuit.
It is easy to infer from this decision that the 
Second Circuit holds a much different view of 
what may be considered “transformative” than 
the Ninth Circuit does.  The functional utility 
of Google indexing and searching is much more 
akin to the “social utility” of photocopying than 
it is to the paradigmatic kind of transformation 
by way of value added that goes on when one 
writer or scholar builds creatively upon the 
work of another.  Judge Newman clearly saw 
the difference.  Band, however, does not.  The 
advice he gives therefore needs to be taken with 
great caution.  The general conclusion that he 
draws from the three cases he analyzes is that 
“repurposing” alone suffices to ground a claim 
of fair use because of its social utility.  Thus he 
thinks it reasonable for an educational institu-
tion to assume that “an educational use of an 
entertainment product is transformative because 
the work is being repurposed….[and, when a 
teacher reproduces a poem, a sound recording, 
or a photograph so that his students can study the 
work, his use is transformative” — as though, 
magically, merely making copies available to 
students somehow adds value to them because 
of the new context of their use.  He further 
suggests that “tools like Blackboard permit an 
instructor to create an online anthology for a 
class, including copyrighted works, commen-
tary, lecture notes, and student reactions” and 
“this recontextualization appears to provide a 
stronger fair use defense than would a library-
run e-reserves containing just the plain text of 
works.”  This theory would also presumably 
sanction publishing such an anthology online 
through the library or an institutional repository, 
eliminating the need for any permissioning of 
the copyrighted contents.  Band does admit 
that “the repurposing argument provides less 
protection with respect to works that target 
the education market,” but he goes on to dis-
tinguish in this respect textbooks from journal 
articles and academic books.  Journal articles, 
he asserts, have scholars as their primary audi-
ence and “because undergraduates are not the 
target audience of journal articles, inclusion of 
such articles in e-reserves or a course Website 
might well be treated as a form of repurposing.” 
Academic books, he believes, fall in a middle 
ground, “but even if the book is aimed to some 
extent at the student market, a course Website 
could recontextualize the book.”
To his credit, Band recognizes that “without 
doubt, many copyright owners will not agree 
with this analysis of the possible implications 
of the three decisions.”  I am not a copyright 
owner, but I do head a university press that 
publishes scholarly books and journals whose 
copyright is owned by Penn State University. 
In that capacity I have a fiduciary responsibility 
to manage the university’s copyrights in the 
best interests of the university, which I inter-
pret to mean that we should challenge uses of 
our works that do not add value to them in the 
usual way understood in fair-use jurisprudence 
but merely reproduce more copies for the 
educational market, which is the principal (and 
often the only) market for our publications.  By 
blurring the distinction between what I have 
elsewhere dubbed as “creative” and “quantita-
tive” uses, Band offers advice to universities 
that may get them in trouble.  My difference 
with Band, in a sense, comes down to a bet: 
will the Second Circuit’s traditionalist inter-
pretation of what “transformative” means ulti-
mately prevail over the Ninth Circuit’s when 
a case involving sheer duplication reaches the 
Supreme Court?  Given how the Supreme 
Court has already reacted to Ninth Circuit 
decisionmaking in the Grokster case, I think I 
have the safer bet.  
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